The publication is reproduced in full below:
RESTRICT Act
Mr. President, I wanted to discuss something because there has been a lot of talk about TikTok in the Halls of Congress lately and I think with good reason because it is becoming increasingly clear that TikTok poses serious national security concerns.
TikTok and its parent company, ByteDance, are Chinese-owned entities with ties to the Chinese Communist Party; and after a Chinese spy balloon floated over our country a few weeks ago, I think it is obvious to everyone that the Chinese Communist Party is hostile to the interests of the United States and spies on American citizens. I can think of few better or easier ways to spy on American citizens or manipulate American public opinion than to make use of a popular app that is used by over 100 million Americans.
In the United States, of course, we have the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution to protect the data Americans provide to apps from being seized by the government, but the Chinese Communist Party has no such restraints. In fact, Chinese law requires social media and technology companies to provide information, including individually identifiable personal information, to the Chinese Government when asked. So there is no legal framework in China to effectively protect TikTok users or users of any China-based app from having their personal information turned over to the Chinese Communist Party.
There are already concerning signs that TikTok users' personal information is not secure. It was reported last year that China-based employees of ByteDance had repeatedly accessed private data from TikTok users in the United States despite TikTok's claim to the contrary; and in December 2022, it was found that ByteDance's employees inside China used the app to obtain the locations of journalists who worked on stories highlighting TikTok's national security risks. This, obviously, has implications for Americans' personal security and privacy, and it raises troubling questions about how the Chinese Communist Party could use TikTok for its own ends whether that is using personal data to develop sources for espionage or manipulating content to advance the Communist Party's agenda.
TikTok is not the first time technology from a hostile nation has posed a serious security concern. Before there was TikTok, we had to engage in a protracted effort to remove technology from Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE from our telecommunications networks after U.S. security officials raised concerns that much of Huawei's and ZTE's equipment was built with ``backdoors,'' giving the Chinese Communist Party access to global communications networks.
The digital age has come with enormous benefits, but it also comes with substantial new threats, not least the threat of a hostile foreign government exploiting communications technology for nefarious purposes. And that threat increases substantially when we are talking about technology, from hardware to social media apps, produced by companies in hostile nations and affiliated with hostile governments.
In recent years, a number of foreign companies in the information and communications technology space--many of them subject to the control of hostile governments--has gained significant market share. Current law provides some remedies for confronting the dangers these companies present.
For example, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or what we call CFIUS, can block attempted investments from foreign companies if these investments are determined to present a national security threat, but the authorities the Federal Government currently has were fashioned in a predigital age and, therefore, are not designed for the specific threats posed by digital technology controlled by foreign adversary nations. As a result, the Federal Government is limited in what it can do in situations like the one we currently face with TikTok.
What is needed is a comprehensive framework for responding to national security risks posed by foreign adversary-owned digital technology whether that is TikTok or some other app or mobile phone technology or internet hardware.
While CFIUS has the ability to address some risks, the reality is that the mere presence of a technology from a foreign adversary in the United States does not trigger a CFIUS review. For a tech platform that does not acquire, merge with, or invest in a U.S. company, the CFIUS review simply does not apply. For example, WeChat, the other Chinese-
controlled app that President Trump sought to ban back in 2020, is, apparently, not subject to a CFIUS review. Legislation is necessary to fill this important gap in authority.
That is why earlier this month, Democrat Senator Mark Warner, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and I introduced the Restricting the Emergence of Security Threats That Risk Information and Communications Technology Act--the long way of saying or the acronym--
the RESTRICT Act, which now has the support of 18 Senators from both parties.
Our legislation would create a comprehensive process, based at the U.S. Department of Commerce, for identifying and mitigating foreign threats to information and communications technology products and services. Now, I want to emphasize that the authorities of the RESTRICT Act only apply to six foreign adversary countries: China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba.
Under our bill, the Department of Commerce would review any information and communications technology product from these countries that is deemed to present a possible security threat, with an emphasis on products used in critical telecommunications infrastructure or with serious national security implications. And the Secretary of Commerce would be required to develop a range of measures to mitigate the danger posed by these products, up to and including a total ban on the product in question.
The bill would also ensure transparency by requiring the Commerce Secretary to coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence to provide declassified information on why any measures taken against foreign adversary-owned technology products were necessary in the first place. Importantly, the RESTRICT Act also requires the Secretary of Commerce to act within 180 days after initiating a review.
A common complaint about the ongoing CFIUS review of TikTok is that it has been open-ended and taken years to complete. By comparison, the RESTRICT Act requires quick action to take the necessary steps to mitigate an undue risk from technology of a foreign adversary nation.
Mr. President, there is bipartisan acknowledgement that TikTok poses a national security threat, and the RESTRICT Act provides a framework for confronting both current and future risks. I am grateful to both Republican and Democratic colleagues for joining Senator Warner and me to introduce this bill.
It is time to update our laws to ensure that we are able to confront the national security threats posed by foreign adversary technology. I look forward to working with colleagues from both parties in both Chambers to advance the RESTRICT Act and get it to the President's desk.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hickenlooper). The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
SOURCE: Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 52
The Congressional Record is a unique source of public documentation. It started in 1873, documenting nearly all the major and minor policies being discussed and debated.
Senators' salaries are historically higher than the median US income.
Alerts Sign-up